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ABSTRACT
In this project, I investigate why police impunity has persisted in Mexico, and
why the application of justice, when it does occur, happens unequally. Mexico has
undergone a democratic transition with a specific focus on increasing accountability in
the judiciary. These persistent trends of police impunity and unequal application of
justice are especially puzzling in the face of these recent shifts. Existing literature argues
that the institutional changes that occur as a result of democratization should yield
changes that further the individual rights of citizens. A majority of the scholarly work
regarding police impunity and justice in Mexico focuses on larger trends, and does not
account for the gaps in which citizen rights are not protected. Additionally, there is a gap
in the literature regarding the why outcomes for police accountability, in the few cases in
which they occur, vary widely.
I argue that the application of justice depends on the involvement of an NGO, the
creation of a strong and salient framing by the NGO, and the ability of the framing to
work within gaps in the political opportunity structure. I examine the three cases of the
women of Atenco, Jacinta Francisco Marcial, and Alberta Alcántara and Teresa
González. These cases involve women who were wrongfully arrested and abused by
police. Despite the initial similarities in these cases, the outcomes and the application of
justice vary widely. My analysis of these cases is supported by two weeks of fieldwork I
completed in Mexico City during January 2016, as well as research on existing literature,
conversations with representatives from NGOs, and news articles and pictures.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
PUZZLE
To a certain degree, police impunity in Mexico is an accepted as a way of life.
Small bribes and corrupt officials are present and expected all across Mexico (Azaola
2008). As a low level member of the municipal police in Mexico City told me, “[Police
impunity] is not something that is hidden…the people live with it day to day” (Mexico
City Policeman, interviewed on 25 January, 2016, translated by author). However, crimes
committed by Mexican police are not confined to small-scale bribery. There are countless
instances in which citizens in Mexico are arrested, detained and illegally tortured by
police. In the majority of these cases, the police go unpunished.
The failure to hold police accountable is puzzling on two levels. Primarily, at a
national level, Mexico has experienced a shift towards democratization that has yielded
changes in many state institutions. As I will explore below, this continuity of police
violence and police impunity contradicts the expected outcome of democratization of
Mexican institutions. Additionally, in the few cases in which justice occurs for victims of
police violence, there is an unequal application of justice.
I examine two main questions in this project. First, why has police impunity
persisted despite democratization and subsequent shifts in the judiciary? Second, in the
small niche of cases in which police violations are punished, why are the outcomes of
justice unequally distributed?
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Democratization and Continued Police Violations
Understanding the nature of the democratic transition in Mexico is difficult. As
Lawson examines in his 2000 essay, Mexico has experienced a “patchwork pattern of
democracy,” in which certain aspects of the society are more democratic than others
(Lawson 2000, 275). The Mexican judiciary has faced significant issues related to
democratization. A series of reforms have been passed in 1994 and most recently in 2008
(Lawson 2000, 284). These most recent reforms have focused on reducing corruption,
making the judicial system more efficient, and increasing the ease with which a victim
can file charges against an alleged perpetrator. With democratization, the judiciary has
experienced significant shifts and reforms. However, despite this focus on the
democratization of the judiciary, the problem of police impunity remains constant. The
police forces in Mexico violate the law and the rights of citizens in Mexico, and they are
not held accountable for these violations, which I classify as illegal, institutional
violations. The violations committed by the police are considered illegal if they include
the excessive use of force, are not primarily for public safety, and violate laws regarding
citizen rights and officer conduct. According to Bittner 1990, a “…characteristic of
almost all police tasks is the officer’s legitimate capacity to use violence to carry out the
lawful directives of public officials or to maintain civic order” (Bittner 1990 in
Carmichael et al). When officers act outside of these bounds to complete a task, they are
doing so in a manner that breaks the law and is therefore illegal.
There are two means by which violations by the police can be classified as
institutionalized. The first places the actions of the police in a larger comparison with the
actions of other police. Is the violation that the officer commits something that other
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officers commit on a regular basis? Do these actions receive punishment or they viewed
as an informally accepted means by which the job of policing can be completed?
Addressing these elements and aspects of police actions demonstrates the connection to
routinization. Routinization of an institutional practice is “regularized patterns of
interactions that are known, practiced, and regularly accepted” (O’Donnell 1994, 60).
Therefore, in applying this theory to that of the informal institution of the police, the
informal practices and institution of the police qualify as routinized if the practice and
type of police violations occur in multiple geographic areas, and are similar across the
different locations. The second aspect of institutionalized violations relates less to the
actions and punishment of the officers, and more to the symbolic or larger meaning
associated with their use of violence. These violations are completed with the larger
purpose of supporting and demonstrating the power of the police force and the larger
organization or leadership of the police bureaucracy. The widespread presence of illegal,
institutionalized violence has been persistent, despite the continued shifts in
democratization of the judiciary.1 With the advent of democratic reforms, one would
expect that police impunity would decrease. Why has police violence against Mexican
citizens persisted unpunished with the democratization of the Mexican judiciary?

Unequal Application of Justice
While the larger trend of not bringing justice against police perpetrators is
puzzling, so too is the unequal manner in which justice is applied to the few cases where

1

For more information on statistics of police violence against citizens, and the
persistence of human rights violations by Mexican police see Azaola 2008 and Sabet
2012.
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police are held accountable. Cases involving police violations that are brought to trial can
have varying outcomes, despite clear similarities of the cases. This differentiated
outcome in the few cases that do come to trial is puzzling due to similarities in the cases,
and the fact that all of the cases go through the same process.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
In this section, I demonstrate why understanding citizenship rights following the
Mexican transition to democracy is important. I identify the gaps in the existing literature
about democratization, and specifically about the Mexican transition to democracy.
Additionally, I build off of existing literature to demonstrate the role of citizenship rights
in Mexico’s developing democracy. Citizenship rights in the context of this paper refer to
the right of citizens to be protected and to receive justice when state actors, specifically
the police, violate their rights. As Brinks states, “the right to be free from arbitrary police
violence,” or to receive justice when police violations do occur, “…has its roots…in the
idea that, in a democracy, everyone is entitled to respectful treatment and due process of
law” (Brinks 2008, 4). As I explore below, the concepts of citizenship rights and
protecting the rights of citizens are intrinsically linked with strengthening the
development of democracy in Mexico. In this analysis, I build off of Deborah Yashar’s
approach to understanding and studying democratization at the level of the citizens and
their rights as opposed to the trend of focusing on the democratization of institutions
(Yashar 1999).
Much of the existing literature about Mexico and other nations transitioning to
democracy focuses on whether or not a country can be classified as a democracy, and
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how various institutions in the country continue to demonstrate authoritarian trends. For
example, Guillermo O’Donnell’s 1994 piece introduces the idea of a “delegative
democracies” and explores how democracies in differing stages of development can be
classified (O’Donnell 1994, 56). O’Donnell, like many other authors, focuses on the
process by which a nation can become a full democracy. However, he does not offer
analysis on how citizenship and citizenship rights are impacted in this grey area of a
delegative democracy, which lies somewhere between an authoritarian regime and a true
representative democracy.
This gap in the literature with regards to understanding citizenship rights during
the shifting transition to democracy is also present in works specific to Mexico and the
Mexican transition. Magaloni’s 2005 chapter about the demise of the PRI and the
development of Mexican democracy focuses on the democratic transition of various
institutions in the Mexican government. For example, Magaloni traces “… the
authoritarian nature of electoral institutions and… the party’s massive electoral support
[and] explores how each of these pillars of the PRI regime was transformed, eventually
leading to the establishment of democracy” (Magaloni 2005, 121). Her work excludes
analysis as to how this transition affected citizenship rights. Some works acknowledge
the gaps in the Mexican transitions and how non-democratic practices have pervaded
despite the transition of larger institutions. For example, Cornelius’ 2000 article examines
how power struggles between the core and the periphery have yielded “potentially
adverse consequences for the completion of Mexico’s transition to democracy”
(Cornelius 2000, 117). Cornelius acknowledges the limits of the Mexican transition and
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the specific factors that create gaps in democracy. However, similar to the work of
Magaloni, he does not fully address how these gaps impact citizenship rights.
This project acknowledges the limits of the Mexican transition to democracy and
fills an gap in the existing literature by narrowing in on the ways in which citizenship
rights are protected and violated in this semi-democratic state. I focus on the specific
gaps where democratization has been unsuccessful: in the prosecution of the police for
crimes against the citizenry. This approach is supported by Yashar’s 1999 article about
how democratic consolidation in Latin America is theorized. Yashar challenges the
existing literature on democratic consolidation, stating that this literature “slights analysis
of ways in which these new [democratic] institutions interact with, engender and/or
constrain (emerging) social forces. [This literature] tends to assume the relevant actors
and how they will respond” (Yashar 1999, 100). Additionally, Yashar argues: “By
analyzing government institutions alone, these studies… gloss over the ways in which
other independent variables, such as…social forces… can impinge on the capacity to
consolidate different aspects of democracy” (Yashar 1999, 99). In this article, Yashar
argues that the trend towards studying democratic transitions through a focus on the
institutions yields a gap in the literature. Much of the literature on democratization, as
Yashar identifies, does not examine the gaps and spaces in which democracy fails, or
how this failure affects the rights of citizens.
Addressing limits in and violations to citizenship rights is an important step in
moving towards a more democratized Mexico. As Oxhorn argues in his 2011 book, “The
inequalities reflected in the capacity of different actors to influence state policies in their
favor at the expense of the majority need to be counterbalanced by a strong, inclusive
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civil society” (Oxhorn 2011, 228-229). An increase in the ability to civil society to utilize
their right to protest and to hold the government accountable will ultimately push back
against the actors and sectors of Mexican society that are not fully democratized. This
notion of the importance of citizenship rights, and the ability of the citizenry to practice
these rights to further promote the democratization of Mexico, is further supported by
Brinks’ 2008 book. Brinks argues that a democratic society must not only build the legal
system and staff the institutions, but also “must endeavor to affirmatively reendow rights
bearers with the secondary, extrajudicial “legal” resources they need in order to engage
the system and make an effective claim of right against the resistance of those who will
oppose their claims” (Brinks 2008, 6). According to Brinks, shifts in the institutions that
allow for citizenship rights to be fully practiced and protected represent a
“change…entrenched social patterns” that will allow for the “ideal of universal
democratic citizenship” (Brinks 2008, 35). As this literature demonstrates, the practice
and support of citizenship rights in a society like Mexico will further the democratization
process, even in the gaps and “authoritarian enclaves” where democratization has not
occurred (Lawson 2000).
With this thesis, I focus on the citizenship right of freedom from police violence
and legal support. Although democratization in Mexico is present in certain aspects of
society, this development has not extended to include prosecution of police who violate
the rights of citizens. I strive to understand why this gap in democratization exists in
Mexico by looking at this history of this trend and the few cases in which victims of
police violence do achieve justice.
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable is the following: the degree of justice received by a
citizen who has been the victim an illegal, institutional violation by the police. The
dimensions of justice to be examined in these cases are restitution of victim’s rights,
accountability for the perpetrator, and reparations for the victim. Restitution focuses on
the victim and involves freeing a victim from prison. Accountability for the perpetrator
involves bringing the police to trial. Reparation is money paid by the state to the victim in
recognition of injustice committed by the state.
Restitution of victim’s rights is the first dimension of justice and focuses on the
immediate safety, well being, and freedom of the victim. The main aspect of this
dimension in cases of police violations against citizens is freedom from unlawful
imprisonment. This dimension must be addressed and granted before the other two
dimensions can be explored.
The second dimension of justice, accountability for the perpetrator, is when the
police are brought to trial in response to alleged crimes committed against the citizen. I
classify being brought to trial as the point in the initial investigation where the police are
arraigned and formally charged. This point requires the following three situations to
occur: 1. The Ministerio Publico (public prosecutor or MP) must decide whether to
pursue the case in court or to dismiss the charges at the point of the corroboration of
facts. 2. If the accused policeman is not arrested following the opening of the
investigation and the criminal proceedings, the judge must approve the petition to arrest
the accused 3. The judge must set a trial date for the first hearing. At this point, the
accused policeman has been formally entered into the criminal justice system. The judge
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and the MP have both agreed that the case is legitimate, and the accused has been
arrested and subjected to preliminary criminal proceedings. A case without at least the
abovementioned three factors will not count as an instance of accountability for the
police.
Accountability for the perpetrator focuses on the initial trial proceedings as
opposed to the outcome of the trial. The decision to focus on the early point in the
criminal trial proceedings as the dependent variable is a result of the following three
factors. First, it is difficult to quantify whether a punishment is a valid response to a
crime, or whether the policeman is held accountable for his crime based on his
punishment. Additionally, there are changes in the Mexican legal system due to the
recent 2008 criminal procedure reforms, and these changes have not been uniformly
adopted around the county. Finally, arraignment of the police demonstrates willingness of
the judge and the MP to move forward with a case even though the defendant is a
policeman.
Reparation for the victim is the third and least important dimension of justice.
This step is not always present, but involves the state or culpable institution paying
indemnity to the victim after the crime and the trial have occurred. With this step, the
state recognizes that it violated the rights of citizens, generally with illegal imprisonment.
The payment of reparations involves the state admitting guilt, or at least that violations of
civil rights occurred, without necessarily punishing involved parties.
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CASE SELECTION
In order to examine accountability for police violations and gaps in the
democratization of the Mexican judiciary, I use the cases of the women of Atenco,
Jacinta Francisco Marcia, and Alberta Alcántara and Teresa González. First, I offer
details about the cases and examine the logic of this selection. I focus on specific aspects
of the cases and rule out alternative arguments. Next, I place these cases in the larger
universe of cases. Finally, I examine the important role of NGOs and why NGO
involvement is an important prerequisite for receiving multiple dimensions of justice.
The women of Atenco are a group of 45 women who were arrested in San
Salvador de Atenco in 2006 for protesting in support of neighbors in Tlateloco. Of the 47
women, 26 reported being sexually assaulted by the police while in police custody. The
women were then transported to a local prison and illegally detained without access to
legal counsel (Centro PRODH et al. 2015). In contrast, Jacinta Francisco Marcial is an
indigenous woman who was arrested for kidnapping federal agents. She was illegally
arrested several months after the alleged kidnapping, and she was also charged with
illegal protest. Jacinta was imprisoned for 3 years before she was released. Alberta and
Teresa were arrested with Jacinta and charged with the same crimes. However, they were
imprisoned longer than she was (Centro PRODH. “Cronología del Proceso de Jacinta
Francisco Marcial Ante el Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa”).
With these three cases, I adopt a model of most similar systems case comparison.
In these cases, many aspects of the case are similar, but the outcome in terms of gained
dimensions of justice differ. The similar dimensions of the cases are outlined below in
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Table 1. The cases are similar in terms of the gender of the victims, their innocence of the
crime they were accused of, and the fact that the perpetrators are federal police.

TABLE 1- Dimensions of Case Similarities
Case

Gender of
Victim
Female

Nature of
Nature of
Victim crime
Police crime
Women of
Disturbing the
Sexual assault,
Atenco
peace, illegal
illegal arrest
protest
and detainment
(baseless
accusation)
Jacinta
Female
Political
Illegal arrest
Francisco
organization,
and detainment
Marcial
kidnapping
federal agent
(baseless
accusation)
Alberta
Female
Political
Illegal arrest
Alcántara and
organization,
and detainment
Teresa
kidnapping
González
federal agent
(baseless
accusation)
Information for this table comes from Centro PRODH et al. 2015 and Centro PRODH.
“Cronología del Proceso de Jacinta Francisco Marcial Ante el Tribunal Federal de
Justicia y Administrativa”.

However, as Table 2 below shows, the case of the women of Atenco yielded more
significant outcomes of justice in terms of immediate restitution of victim’s rights and
accountability for the police. Jacinta received elements of justice, and Alberta and Teresa
barely achieved the first dimension of justice. Despite this abovementioned similarities in
the cases, the outcomes of justice in all three cases clearly differed.
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TABLE 2- Differences in Case Outcomes
Element of
Justice
Outcome
Restitution of
Victim Rights

Women of Atenco

Accountability
for Perpetrator

Partial- some (but not
all) police officers were
brought to trial before
2009, since then the
process has stalled
No
Partial- mandated No
but not yet paid

Reparation to
Victim

Yes

Jacinta
Francisco
Marcial
Yes- but after 3
years of
imprisonment
No

Alberta and
Teresa
Partial- after 3
years and 7 months
of imprisonment
No

Information for this table comes from Centro PRODH et al. 2015 and Centro PRODH.
“Cronología del Proceso de Jacinta Francisco Marcial Ante el Tribunal Federal de
Justicia y Administrativa”.

With this specific case selection, I can control for arguments stating that the
gender of the victim is the primary factor in determining the outcome of justice. In all
cases the victims were women, but the outcomes of dimensions of justice differed.
Additionally, all the women were innocent of the crimes they were accused of and yet
they still received differing outcomes of dimensions of justice. Therefore, I control for
the argument that the innocence of the victim yields more dimensions of justice. Finally,
as the perpetrators in both cases are federal police, I can control for the argument that the
outcome of justice depends primarily on the identity of the perpetrators.
These cases are landmark cases in terms of bringing justice to victims. However,
it is important to note that, I am examining a very small subset within the larger universe
of cases. Police violence against citizens goes largely unreported, and most instances of
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police violations are not officially reported or noted (Azaola 2008). Within the small
number of cases that are reported, very few result in at least two dimensions of justice for
the victims. Through examining the cases of the women of Atenco and Jacinta, I focus on
this small subset of cases in which the victims receive restitution of their rights and either
accountability for the police or reparations from the state. The outcome of success in
these cases is largely dependent on the work of NGOs, who create a frame, mobilize the
citizenry, and work within the political opportunity structure to bring dimensions of
justice to the victims.
In contrast to the cases of the women of Atenco and Jacinta, the case of Alberta
and Teresa is a negative case in which outcomes of success do not occur. Alberta and
Teresa did not receive the first dimension of justice, which is restoration of victims’
rights, until several months after Jacinta did. The PGR (federal attorney general’s office)
dropped the case against Jacinta in September of 2009. However, even after Jacinta was
released, Alberta and Teresa were re-sentenced to jail, and they were not freed until April
2010. Furthermore, Jacinta was awarded reparation by the state, but Alberta and Teresa
were not, even though all three women were arrested together for the same crime and
imprisoned together for three years. According to a representative from an NGO who
worked closely with Jacinta, the main reason why Alberta and Teresa were kept in prison
after Jacinta had been released was because Alberta and Teresa did not have an NGO
supporting their case (Unnamed representative from an NGO, interview over Skype on
March 8, 2016). This divergence in outcomes, and the reason why Alberta and Teresa are
a negative case of limited success in this study, stems from the fact that Alberta and
Teresa did not use an NGO to support their case. The absence of an NGO in the cases of
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Alberta and Teresa, and the subsequent outcome of their case, clearly demonstrates the
importance of NGOs in achieving multiple dimensions of justice for the victims, a
variable that will be examined in depth below

ARGUMENT
I attempt to address the problem of why some cases of police violence against
citizens yield multiple dimensions of justice, while others have a less successful outcome
with fewer or no dimensions of justice. To explain this phenomenon, I focus on three
variables: NGOs, framing, and the political opportunity structure. I argue that victims of
police violence will achieve more significant dimensions of justice if the NGO supporting
the case creates a strong and salient frame, and if there is an opening in the political
opportunity structure that makes the framing relevant. Below, I introduce and define the
three main variables to be examined in this argument.

NGOs
The first variable is the necessary condition of an NGO accepting the case of the
victim of police violence. An NGO can accept a case by agreeing to work with victims
and their families. This variable consists of local NGOs or NGOs within Mexico. After
the NGO adopts the case and creates a frame, other NGOs, especially international
NGOs, can begin to be involved in the case. This variable must be present in order for a
frame to be created and to have an opportunity to impact the government through an
opening in the political opportunity structure.
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Centro PRODH, an NGO based in Mexico City, picked up the case of the women
of Atenco. This NGO began working with the women as soon as they were arrested, and
continues to be involved in ongoing protests today. Following the involvement of Centro
PRODH, other international NGOs became involved in the case as well. For example,
Amnesty International has supported the women of Atenco through monetary donations
and a letter writing campaign.
When Jacinta Francisco Marcial was arrested, Alberta Alcántara and Teresa
González were also arrested with her. Therefore, I examine the role of NGOs in these two
cases together. A local NGO in Queretaro, the home state of the women, brought the case
to the attention of the NGO Centro PRODH in Mexico City (Unnamed representative
from an NGO, interview over Skype on March 8, 2016). Centro PRODH agreed to take
the case and to represent the women at trial.
The families of Alberta and Teresa decided not to accept the offer from Centro
PRODH, and the defense and support of Alberta and Teresa came mostly from local
lawyers and public defenders. Alberta and Teresa did not have an NGO creating a frame
and supporting mobilization for their cause. They were unable to use gaps within the
political opportunity structure to make their case more relevant. Therefore, the framing
and political opportunity structure variables do not apply to this case. Working with an
NGO to create framing is a necessary condition for achieving multiple dimensions of
justice. In order for a frame to be created and effectively used in the existing political
structure, an NGO must be involved with the victims of police violence.
Framing
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The second variable is how well the NGOs create a frame that completes the three
core tasks of framing (Snow & Benford 1988). The concept of the three core tasks of
framing is explored in Snow and Benford’s 1988 essay. The authors state
“There are three core framing tasks: (1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of
social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposed solution to the
diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call to arms or
rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action” (Snow & Benford
1988, 199)
These three framing tasks- diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational- create consensus on
what the problem is and move people to mobilize in response to the problem (Benford &
Snow 2000, 615). In the cases of the women of Atenco and Jacinta Francisco Marcial,
NGOs deliberately created a framing to support mobilization and to bring the police
officers to trial. Within each frame, I examine the extent to which Snow and Benford’s
three core tasks of framing are present and successful. According to these works, the
mobilization effort will be more strongly supported if the three core framing tasks are
better developed (Benford & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1988).
I argue that the NGOs in the case of the women of Atenco were more successful
at completing the three core tasks of framing. With the support of Centro PRODH, the
women of Atenco clearly achieved the three core framing tasks. The problem of police
corruption and state culpability was clearly diagnosed; a solution of punishing the state
and state actors was offered; and the frame was expanded and amplified to include other
victims of state violence. The presence of these core framing tasks therefore created a
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more salient frame that Centro PRODH used to influence the government through gaps in
the political opportunity structure.
In contrast, the case of Jacinta Francisco Marcial had a less salient frame that did
not complete that three core framing tasks as well as the women of Atenco did. A
diagnosis of Jacinta’s imprisonment as the issue to be addressed was the initial focus of
the framing. While this framing was necessary at the time, due to the fact that Jacinta was
still in prison, this framing did not successfully diagnose the larger issue of police
violations. Furthermore, once the prognosis of freeing Jacinta was achieved, the NGOs
were unable to shift the frame to a different prognosis focused on punishing the police.
Finally, the framing was not as successful in motivating widespread mobilization because
the NGOs did not expand or amplify the frame. Unlike the framing of the women of
Atenco, which drew in other victims of state and sexual violence, the framing of Jacinta
focused on the specific abuses committed against her. Other groups and individuals were
not drawn in to mobilize, as the case of Jacinta was not framed as being about them.

Political Opportunity Structure Openings and Shifts
Finally, the third variable focuses on whether nuances of the case and the framing
can yield specific openings for the victims’ story to be relevant. I examine political
opportunity structure through the analysis presented by Meyer and Minkoff in their 2004
piece. The authors focus on “distinguishing between general openness in the polity and
openness to particular constituencies, that is, issue-specific opportunities” (Meyer &
Minkoff 2004, 1458). I argue that the political opportunity structure responds to these
“issue specific opportunities,” which can shift depending on the state actors involved, and
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the legitimacy of the accusations leveled against these state actors (Meyer & Minkoff
2004, 1458). For the purposes of this project, political opportunity structure is more
focused on specific opportunities present in each case, rather than widespread openness
or restriction of the political system.
The women of Atenco had a strong frame, and this frame was used by NGOs to
exploit an opening in the political opportunity structure until this opening shifted closed
in 2009. This frame clearly targeted the state as the larger agent responsible for the
crimes committed against the women of Atenco. The victims and the NGOs named the
police who arrested the women and Enrique Peña Nieto, the governor of the State of
Mexico at the time, as culpable for the crime. Much of the framing targeted these specific
actors, with the focus of gaining the second dimension of justice: accountability for the
state and the police. This targeting was an example of an issue specific opportunity as
described above; there was an opening because an important and visible member of the
government, the governor, was implicated in the event (Meyer & Minkoff 2004).
However, in 2009, the political opportunity structure shifted such that this
framing was no longer salient, following the ruling by the Supreme Court of Mexico that
the state was not culpable for ordering the abuses (Amnesty International 2009). While
several police were lightly punished following this development, the state and Peña Nieto
were able to refer to the legal outcome that stated they were not guilty of or responsible
for any of the crimes of Atenco. Even though the framing was strong and initially
successful, the state closed the issue-specific opportunity following the legal ruling that
the state was not culpable. Therefore, the political opportunity structure shifted such that
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the framing, which targeted specific actors and the state as guilty, was no longer
influential.
In contrast, Jacinta Francisco Marcial did not have an initial issue-specific
opportunity in the political opportunity structure. As discussed above, the framing of the
case of Jacinta was less salient than that of the women of Atenco, and did not complete
the three core framing tasks as successfully. In this framing, no specific actors were
marked as directly culpable for the crime because much of the focus was on Jacinta as the
victim. Even if specific actors had been named, the case of Jacinta did not involve high
state officials like the case of the women of Atenco did. While the women of Atenco
experienced a specific event that changed and closed the political opportunity structure,
Jacinta’s case never had the initial opening due to the nature of the frame and the actors
involved in her crime.
Table 3 below clearly identifies the three main variables and how these variables
map on to the cases to be examined.
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TABLE 3- Application of Independent Variables to Cases
Variables to be examined

Women of
Atenco

Does NGO accept case and make a
frame
Are Core
Diagnostic
Framing Tasks
Prognostic
Completed?

Motivational

Alberta and Teresa

Yes

Jacinta
Francisco
Marcial
Yes

Yes

Yes

Not applicable

Yes

Partial- not as
successfully as
the case of
Atenco
Partial

Not applicable

Yes

No

Not applicable
Not applicable

Is There An Opening in the Political
Partial- until No
Opportunity Structure?
2009 case
Information for this table comes from Centro PRODH et al. 2015 and Centro PRODH.
“Cronología del Proceso de Jacinta Francisco Marcial Ante el Tribunal Federal de
Justicia y Administrativa”.

DATA COLLECTION
Data for this project is based on in-person interviews, existing literature on police
violence and prosecution in Mexico, press and media images and stories, and sources
about the cases supplied by NGOs. The interviews were collected during the last two
weeks of January 2016 in Mexico City. The questions asked in my interviews varied
depending on the subjects. My primary goal in these interviews was to gain an
understanding of how the Mexican judiciary functions in practice. I focused on the
specific instances in which the legal code of Mexico gave way to informal practices or
trends in the judiciary. I spoke with 9 individuals including bureaucrats, a policeman, a
professor, representatives from two different NGOs, and several lawyers. I also spoke
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with several contacts from Mexico via Skype once I returned to the United States. For the
safety of the interviewees, I have kept their identities private.
These interviews served several valuable purposes. Primarily, I gained a deeper
understanding of the Mexican legal system and how it functions in reality. I interviewed
lawyers native to Mexico and licensed to practice law there who are involved in criminal
and civil law. These lawyers offered their unique perspectives on how the judicial system
functions, the areas in which it should change, and the extent to which the 2008 reform
has been successfully applied to courts in Mexico City and nationally. I met with a
member of an NGO who was formerly employed by the federal police to help implement
the new reforms. She provided information about the specific channels through which a
case should go, and how 2008 reforms changed this process.
I also met with several representatives in the government, who gave me their
nuanced perceptions on the role of the government in assuring citizen safety and
reporting police violations. One of these bureaucrats works for the PGJ, the attorney
general’s office for Mexico City, and the other works for the PGR, the federal attorney
general’s office for all of Mexico. These conversations gave me a perspective of the
federal and local bureaucratic responses to police impunity.
One representative from an NGO worked closely with Jacinta Francisco Marcial,
and provided important information about her case. Similar to my conversations with the
lawyers, he offered me a perspective of the realities of the judiciary in Mexico, especially
as related to civil rights cases and instances of police violations. This source also
connected me to primary source material, print stories, and photographs from various
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NGOs and media outlets. These sources were vital to understanding and analyzing the
framing created by the NGOs for each case.
It is important to note the limits of data collection associated with this specific
topic. Primarily, the issue of police prosecution is a politically sensitive topic about
which certain members of Mexican society are unwilling to speak. Police violence
against citizens is largely unpunished, and speaking against state actors can be dangerous.
Additionally, my project examines a small niche of an outcome that occurs. Therefore,
data and information about this negative outcome is difficult to find. Furthermore, I am
examining a trend of impunity, or crimes committed by police against citizens that are
not initially prosecuted. It is difficult to measure and obtain quantitative data regarding
police abuse and the percentage of police violations that are not prosecuted or reported.
Due to these limits of data collection, my qualitative data gathered from scholarly works,
interviews, and primary source material supports a theoretical analysis of the problem of
police impunity in Mexico.

PREVIEW OF THESIS
In this section, I identify the following chapters of this project, and demonstrate
how these chapters support the argument stated above.
In chapter two, I offer a historical analysis of police violence and democratization
in Mexico. I examine why police impunity has persisted in the 21st century, and why this
continued trend is surprising in the context of the democratization of Mexico in the
1990s. Building on existing literature about party control of the Mexican state and the
means by which the PRI informally controls state actors, I argue that the PRI has limited
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the enforcement of accountability measures. Police in Mexico enjoy impunity, as do other
state actors. Additionally, I examine how the democratization of Mexico has not
successfully reduced corruption and impunity in the judicial system. This chapter
establishes important background information and themes that support the analysis
offered in subsequent chapters.
Chapter three examines the case of the women of Atenco. In this chapter, I
attempt to explain how strong framing and a gap in the political opportunity structure
yielded greater justice. The outcome of more dimensions of justice in the case of Atenco
is puzzling because the case is similar in many respects to that of Jacinta Francisco
Marcial. The case of the women of Atenco yields the most success for the victims, and
the highest level of accountability for the police involved in the violations. I argue that
the ability of the NGO to build a salient frame that achieved all three core framing tasks
combined with an issue specific opening in the political opportunity structure yielded
initial success for the women of Atenco. However, the political opportunity structure
changed and shifted, therefore limiting the effectiveness of the frame after 2009. The
outcomes of this case sharply contrast with those of Jacinta, Alberta and Teresa.
Chapter four focuses on the case of Jacinta Francisco Marcial, and introduces the
smaller case study of the case of Alberta and Teresa. In this chapter, I seek to answer the
several questions. How did the difference in the framing between the cases of the women
of Atenco and Jacinta impact the outcome of justice for Jacinta? What is the role of the
NGO in creating framing for a victim of police violence? How does the absence of an
NGO impact the ability of a victim to receive justice? I examine how differences in
framing can impact the ability of an NGO to mobilize protesters, and analyze why the
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framing of Jacinta’s case was less salient than that of the women of Atenco. In this
chapter, I argue that the framing of Jacinta’s case did not fully achieve the three core
framing tasks, and was therefore weaker. The limited salience of this framing was further
weakened by the lack of an opening in the political opportunity structure. Additionally, I
briefly examine why NGOs are a necessary condition through a comparison of the cases
of Jacinta and Alberta and Teresa. This chapter demonstrates how a weak framing that is
not salient for achieving accountability for the police can yield other gains of justice,
such as reparations.
Finally, in my conclusion, I synthesize the three cases mentioned above and apply
the findings of this project to other cases of police impunity in Mexico. While this project
deals with three specific cases of police impunity, the findings of this project can be
applied to further police accountability in Mexico. I examine sources that would further
my analysis and introduce variables and cases for further study.
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CHAPTER 2: TRENDS IN POLICE IMPUNITY AND DEMOCRATIZING
SHIFTS
INTRODUCTION
In many instances of police violence against citizens, the police are not held
accountable to the existing laws that should restrict police abuse.
In this chapter, I address issues of police accountability in Mexico between 1930 and
1970, and examine why police in Mexico were not held accountable by the judiciary for
police violations of citizenship rights. Additionally, I analyze the specific shifts that
occurred during democratization, and demonstrate how these changes should have
yielded increased protection of citizenship rights. I argue that police violence persisted
between 1930 and 1970 due to the role of the PRI, and continued from 1970 to present
day due to the ability of the PRI to adapt to democratizing changes. I focus on these past
citizenship violations in an effort to better understand how modern day outcomes of
justice remain constant with historical trends. I find that, despite increased
democratization and accountability in multiple levels of the state, the instances of victims
of police crimes being granted multiple dimensions of justice remain relatively low.
In this chapter, I offer a historical analysis of the role of the PRI in Mexico and
trends of police violations. I break this chapter into two sections: the era of strong control
by the PRI, 1930-1970, and the era of democratization, 1970-modern day. In the first
section, I examine the role of the PRI in covering up and allowing for police violations.
Second, I trace the process of democratization, and analyze the specific changes that
occurred in the judiciary.
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CONTROL BY THE PRI, 1930-1976
The time period from 1930 to 1976 is known as the golden age of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional, or the PRI. The PRI is a political party that ruled mostly
uncontested during this time period, and grew to control many aspects of Mexican
government and society. In order to understand how the PRI’s control of society limited
citizenship rights, I offer a history of the PRI, the judiciary, and the police in Mexico
during this period of PRI control. Additionally, I offer analysis about the means by which
the judiciary was supposed to function, and how this process was influenced by the PRI
through, centralization, norming of illegal action, and collusion.

HISTORY OF THE PRI
The PRI was first established as the PNR, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, in
1929 by Plutarco Calles, following the assassination of president elect Álvaro Obregón
(Krauze 1997, 428). Calles centralized control through the party to fill the “political
vacuum created by Obregón’s death, and…continued to rule behind the scenes as the Jefe
Máximo” (Meyer & Sherman 1995, 590-591). The PNR became a means by which
Calles, or the leader of the party, could control the decisions and players of Mexican
politics.
The PNR became the Partido del la Revolución Mexicana, PRM, during the
Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (Krauz 1997, 479). Cárdenas maintained the principles of
centralized control of the Mexican state, and authoritarian control of electoral outcomes.
However, Cárdenas also shifted the original focus of the party to include the lower
classes and the working sectors of Mexico, and the new PRM was “mass-based and much
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more corporatist”(Krauz 1997, 479). Rather than focusing on the upper echelons, the
PRM expanded its focus to protect the lower class citizens and to gain their vote. The
PRM maintained the practice of “guiding” presidential elections by allowing the outgoing
president to chose his successor (Krauz 1997, 479). Although the peasants were now
included in the party system, the PRM maintained control over election outcomes in
Mexico.
Finally, the PRM became the PRI in 1946 during the presidency of Manuel Avila
Camacho (Krauz 1997, 560). This final name change coincided with the
institutionalization of PRI control of elections in Mexico. In 1946, a new law was passed
that “assigned management of elections and polling places to …[c]ommittees controlled
by the government” (Krauz 1997, 561). This law, and the new structure of the PRI,
ensured the electoral success by the PRI until the 1970’s2.
Between 1930 and 1975, the PRI demonstrated control of Mexican society
through domination of national elections and nominations and strong centralized control
in Mexico City. The PRI maintained “a disproportionately large political presence within
the Mexican Political System,” and their presence was clear throughout the Mexican
government (Rodriguez & Ward 1994, 165). The PRI was the dominant party in the
national legislature, and controlled electoral nominations (Chandler 2013, 1; Gillingham
2012, 15). According to Meyer and Sherman, “Party nomination was tantamount to
election” (Meyer and Sherman 1995, 648). The PRI was also a dominating presence in
“leading corporatist structures” and in Mexican business practices (Centeno 1994, 38).
2

While the PRI technically controlled the presidency until 2000, changes in the Mexican
government led a decline in the power of the PRI. Beginning in 1970, the PRI began to
lose power and influence, and reforms yielded the opening up of the political process for
members from other parties. See Magaloni 2005.
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The PRI ruled and controlled Mexican national politics from D.F., the capital and the
center of government and party power.
Much of the history of the PRI focuses on the role of this party in influencing and
controlling the executive branch. In examining the protection of citizenship rights, it is
important to focus specifically on the courts, as this branch of the government is the main
protector of citizenship rights. Below, I analyze the role and influence of the
abovementioned PRI on the supposedly independent judiciary.

HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY
As the institution of the PRI changed, so too did other government institutions in
the Mexican system. The judiciary experienced significant development during this time
period. Members of the government, specifically presidents and actors in the executive
branch, introduced measures to formalize and modernize this institution. In terms of
judicial development, reforms initiated by the PRI in 1929 and 1931 changed procedures
regarding judicial discretion and mandatory sentencing laws. These reforms gave
individual judges more free reign to rule on cases and to decide punishments (Speckman
Guerra 243 in Cornelius and Shirk 2007). Furthermore, the specifics of the criminal court
and the procedures and norms of judicial behavior were further clarified in this new
legislation (Speckman Guerra 237 in Cornelius and Shirk 2007).
However, the judiciary was still influenced by the executive through the
Procraduría General and the influence of the PRI in Mexican government. The Mexican
president directly selected the Procraduría General, or the attorney general (Schatz et al.
200 in Cornelius and Shirk 2007). Therefore, a PRI president, appointed public
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prosecutors, who were significant variable in the judicial system. Even with the
abovementioned reforms, the judiciary was still influenced and controlled by the PRI and
the executive.

HISTORY OF THE POLICE
In contrast to the changes visible in the judiciary, the police institutions did not
experience institutional shifts that fully altered the means by which the police and the
citizens interacted. The police institutions in Mexico still dealt with problems related to
corruption, abuse of citizens, and lack of institutional organization well into the period of
the PRI golden age. According to Daniel Sabet, “Arguably a concerted effort to
professionalize Mexican law enforcement did not begin until… the federal administration
of Ernesto Zedillo… (1994-2000)” (Sabet 2012, 8).
However, while there were not significant reforms focused on fixing internal
corruption in the police forces, the police in Mexico were clearly organized into distinct
types of police: the policía preventiva and the policía judicial. These classifications are
still present today in the Mexican policing system (Reames 2003, 3). The policía
preventiva are the “order-controlling” police who are charged with public safety and “do
not investigate crimes”. In contrast, the policía judicial are associated with the
Procuraduría General (PGR), and investigate crimes at the behest of the PGR (Reames
2003, 3).
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POLICE ABUSE OF CITIZENS AND NORMS OF ILLEGAL ABUSE
In conjunction with understanding the larger trends of policing in Mexico, another
important aspect of study is examining police and the citizen’s interactions, and how
police were supposed to be held accountable for abuse against citizens. Therefore, this
section examines the rules that should have resulted in punishment against police who
violated the civil rights of citizens. Additionally, this section offers analysis examining
how accountability measures for the police were actually enforced, and case studies of
instances where police were not held accountable for their actions.
While police were not always held accountable for crimes committed against the
citizenry, regulations for the police existed. If a citizen experienced abuse by a
policeman, there was an established set of procedures to be followed. The laws
mandating the functioning of these accountability responses were clearly established, but
were not always fully followed. Below, in Table 3, I outline the traditional judicial
process that should have happened following a citizen report of abuse by a policeman.

